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We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world net-
work. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that
of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different
topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs,
produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribu-
tion towards the study of social phenomena and transitions
governed by the topology of the community.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg
The search for models that account for the complex
behavior of biological, social and economic systems has
been the motivation of much interdisciplinary work in the
last decade [1]. In particular, the emergence of altruis-
tic or cooperative behavior is a favorite problem of game
theoretical approaches [2]. In this context, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game [3] has been widely studied in different
versions, as a standard model for the confrontation be-
tween cooperative and selfish behaviors, the later man-
ifested by a defecting attitude, aspiring to obtain the
greatest benefit from the interaction with another indi-
vidual. It is usually implemented in zero dimensional
systems, where every player can interact with any other.
It has also been studied on a regular lattice, where a
player can interact with its nearest neighbors in an array
[4]. In a regular lattice the concept of a k-neighborhood is
straightforward. It is composed of the k nearest individ-
uals to a given one. However, social situations are rarely
well described by such extreme networks. The topology
of social communities is much better described by what
has been called small-world networks [5,6]. In the version
of small worlds that we use in this work, the “regular”
k-neighborhood of an individual is modified by breaking
a fraction of its k original links. An equal amount of new
links are created, adding to the neighborhood a set of
individuals randomly selected from the whole system.
We have studied a simple model of an evolutionary
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game played in small-
world networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma was chosen as a
paradigm of a system capable to display both cooperative
and competitive behaviors [7]. The evolutionary dynam-
ics is implemented by an imitation behavior. It is im-
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portant to notice that, contrary to the iterated version of
the game, our players do not remember past encounters.
The emergence of cooperation is only due to the spatial
organization of the players. This is the main rationale be-
hind the study of the influence of the topological aspects
of the community. We have explored different topologies,
ranging from a regular lattice to random graphs, going
through the small worlds. We have found surprising col-
lective behaviors corresponding to the small-world sys-
tems, put on evidence by the enhancement of defection
in situations where cooperation is the norm.
We set up a system of N players arranged at the ver-
tices of a network (as described below). Each player is
a pure strategist, adopting either a cooperative or a de-
fecting strategy. Each vertex is connected, on average, to
other 2K vertices, that we call its neighbors. The edges
connecting two vertices enable the interaction between
players. A round of play consists in the confrontation of
every player with all its neighbors. Each one of these pro-
duces a profit for the player, computed with the payoff
matrix:
C D
C r s
D t p
(1)
Each element in the payoff matrix represents the payoff
of a player performing the strategy at left, when con-
fronting a player that performs the strategy above. A de-
fector D obtains t —the temptation to defect—when its
opponent is a cooperator (C), who gets s —the sucker’s
payoff. Each of two cooperators obtains a reward r, while
each of two defectors is punished with p. The Prisoner’s
Dilemma is played with t > r > p > s and 2r > t+ s. In
this work we use a simplified version of the game, assum-
ing that s = p = 0, r = 1. All the interesting features of
the game are preserved [4], and we are left with a single
parameter to play with.
Let’s represent the players with two-component vectors
x, taking the values (1, 0) for C-strategists and (0, 1) for
D-strategists. The payoff matrix is:
A =
(
1 0
t 0
)
. (2)
As a result of the confrontation with its neighbors in a
single round, at time τ , each player collects a payoff
Pi(τ) =
∑
j∈Ωi
xiAx
T
j , (3)
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where Ωi is the set of neighbors of element i. Pi is the
profit earned by a player in a time step, and it is not
accumulated from round to round.
After this, the players are allowed to inspect the profit
collected by its neighbors in that round, adopting the
strategy of the wealthiest among them for the next round
of play. If there is a draw between more than one neigh-
bor, one of them is chosen at random to be imitated. If
the element under consideration is itself one of the win-
ners of the round, it keeps its own strategy. That is,
explicitly writing the time dependence of the strategies:
xi(τ+1) =
{
xi(τ) if Pi(τ) ≥ max(P ∈ Ωi)
xj(τ) if j ∈ Ωi and Pj(τ) = max(P ∈ Ωi).
We have found that a small amount of noise is essen-
tial to prevent the system from falling in a frozen state.
After a round of play, we chose one element at random
and flip its strategy. This is enough to keep the system
out of equilibrium and allow transitions between different
states.
As a playground for our system, we have used a family
of small-world networks that depend on a parameter ǫ
[6]. We start from a regular, one-dimensional, periodic
lattice of coordination number 2K. We then run sequen-
tially through each of the sites, rewiring K of its links
with probability ǫ. Running from 0 to 1, this parame-
ter changes the wiring properties of the network, ranging
from a completely ordered lattice at ǫ = 0, to a ran-
dom network at ǫ = 1. Intermediate values of ǫ produce
a continuous spectrum of small-world networks. Double
connections between sites, as well as the connection of
a site with itself, are avoided in the construction of the
network. Since we neither destroy nor create links, the
resulting network has an average coordination number
2K, equal to the initial one. This method, however, can
produce disconnected graphs, that we have avoided in
our analysis. Note that ǫ is related to the fraction of
modified regular links.
Two magnitudes characterize the topological proper-
ties of the small-world networks generated by the indi-
cated procedure. One of them, L(ǫ), measures the typical
separation between any pair of elements in the network.
The other, C(ǫ), measures the clustering of an element’s
neighborhood [6]. Ordered lattices are highly clustered,
and have large L. Random graphs have short character-
istic length and small clusterization. In between, small
worlds can be characterized by a high clusterization (like
lattices) and short path lengths (like random networks).
The opposing tendencies of cooperation and defection
perform differently for different payoff tables and differ-
ent topologies, through the values of t and ǫ. Disregard-
ing ǫ, one may qualitatively expect that, for sufficiently
high values of t it would pay to defect while, for low val-
ues of t, it would be worth to cooperate. In either of
these two extremes, the system would collapse to a state
formed only by defectors (in the first case) or only by co-
operators (in the second case). For intermediate values
of t the system would settle into a mixed state consisting
in cooperators and defectors. Cooperators would thrive
through the formation of clusters, that can resist the in-
vasion by defectors. The dependency on the topology of
the network appears on top of these three regimes. From
the structure of the payoff matrix one may conjecture
that the high values of t referred to above will be around
t = 2 (where a defector earns twice as much as a pair of
cooperators). Correspondingly, the low values of t will
be around t = 1 (where a single cooperator earns more
than a defector).
In the following we show the results of simulations per-
formed in systems with 1000 elements. The initial strate-
gies are assigned at random with equal probability. Then
several hundred rounds are played to allow for an asymp-
totic regime to be achieved. All the results shown are
averages over realizations where both the networks and
the initial conditions are randomly chosen, excluding all
disconnected graphs from our analysis.
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FIG. 1. Fraction of defectors as a function of the tempta-
tion to defect t, for different values of the rewiring probability
ǫ (as shown in the legend). The results correspond to 10 in-
dependent realizations of 1000 elements, run for 500 rounds
after a transient of 200 rounds. Note that the range of t ex-
tends to values lower than 1, where the game is not a proper
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The number of cooperators and defectors are fluctu-
ating variables, with bell shaped distributions. In figure
1 we show the average fraction of defectors in systems
with K = 2, that is, systems with an average coordina-
tion number of four. Four curves are shown as a function
of the parameter t. Each curve corresponds to a network
characterized by the parameter ǫ shown in the legend.
All the curves show a growth in the fraction of defectors
for growing values of t, as expected. We can see however,
that the small world corresponding to ǫ = 0.1 displays
an enhanced number of defectors at values of t around
1.2. For systems with a fixed K and a fixed t, this means
2
that the existence of a small world topology with ǫ ∼ 0.1
represents that nearly 40% of the population adopts the
defecting strategy, against the 20% of more regular or
more random networks. (Note that, in fig. 1, we have
included values of t lower than 1, where the game is not
a proper Prisoner’s Dilemma, since the reward for coop-
eration is greater that the temptation to defect. We have
done so because the state of the system at t = 1, for all
values of ǫ, still contains a small fraction of defectors. We
wanted to stress that for low enough values of t the state
is complete cooperation.)
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FIG. 2. Fraction of defectors as a function of the rewiring
probability ǫ, for different values of K (as shown in the leg-
end). The results are derived from 10 independent realizations
of 1000 elements, run for 1000 rounds after a transient of 1000
rounds. Games played with t = 1.2
In figure 2 we show a plot of the same system, but with
the fraction of defectors as a function of ǫ, to emphasize
the changes in behavior as the structure of the network
varies. The four curves correspond to different coordina-
tion numbers. The game corresponds to the value t = 1.2
in the payoff matrix, so that the curve with K = 2 is a
slice of figure 1 cut at t = 1.2. Note that only this curve
has a clear high peak of defectors centered near ǫ = 0.1.
Systems with K = 3 have a downward peak instead, in
the region of small worlds, indicating a slight enhance-
ment of the cooperative strategy. For K = 4 we can see
again a small peak of defectors. Systems with K = 5 and
greater (not shown) display a monotonous behavior in ǫ.
Some conjecture on the origin of these features may be
appropriate here. We think that the competition between
the stability of clusters of cooperators and their exploita-
tion by neighbor defectors at the borders contributes to
the features observed here. When K = 2, the coopera-
tors survive in small compact groups. As ǫ grows, these
groups can be formed by elements widely dispersed in the
system, where they will have more defector neighbors to
compete with. In this way, there will be less configura-
tions to support them and, consequently, more defectors
in the system. For ǫ even greater, and more long range
links, cooperators may start to reconnect and survive the
competition with the defectors. When K > 2, the coop-
erators can only survive in larger groups, because de-
fecting neighbors at the border of a group can penetrate
deeper. When ǫ grows, cooperators belonging to faraway
groups may become connected to form large clusters able
to survive. The fact that K = 3, at t = 1.2 shows a slight
decrease in the fraction of defectors at intermediate val-
ues of ǫ remains, however, unexplained in this picture.
At other values of t, we observed that the system with
K = 3 performs like that with K = 2, namely with an
enhancement of defector at intermediate values of ǫ.
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FIG. 3. Distribution of the fraction of “unsatisfied” or ac-
tive elements, for different values of the rewiring probability
ǫ (as shown in the legend). The results correspond to 100 in-
dependent realizations of 1000 elements, run for 1000 rounds
after a transient of 1000 rounds, with t = 1.2.
Also, we have observed that, for every system, there
is a fluctuating number of “unsatisfied” elements that
change their strategy. There is a Gaussian distribution
of these unsatisfied elements, whose mean increases with
ǫ, as shown in figure 3. This behavior is observed for all
values of K and of t, namely that regular lattices contain
a smaller number of unsatisfied elements than random
networks, with small worlds in between.
Most of what is analytically known about small worlds
refers to the distribution of shortest paths between pairs
of elements (see for example [8–10]). It is known that reg-
ular lattices stand apart from even infinitesimally rewired
small worlds, that behave like random networks. The ex-
istence of a phenomenon like the enhancement of defec-
tors density at a finite value of ǫ, as shown in this work,
points to the existence of an interesting phenomenology
in small worlds. The broad spectrum of behaviors of a
given system as a function of the topological features of
the network is the main aspect that we want to empha-
size. This suggests the possibility of modelling a certain
system featuring well known interactions and analyzing
the influence of the particular organization the commu-
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nity. Moreover, the possibility of a self organizing net-
work with changing links opens the possibility of mod-
elling more realistically social and economical situations
[11]. At this point we can state that the self organization
of the network can lead to a nontrivial behavior of the
whole system. Another interesting example of this state-
ment would be a simple SIR model for the propagation
of an epidemic. This is the subject of work under way
[12].
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